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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
After being convicted of felony possession of sexually exploitative material, John 
Meier filed a motion for the return of property that was taken as a result of a probation 
search. The property at issue was unrelated to the charge that Mr. Meier pleaded guilty 
to; and, as part of the plea agreement, the State waived the right to bring any charges 
related to the property, which the State believed to have been stolen. After holding a 
hearing and receiving affidavits from loss prevention officers claiming the property was 
stolen from various stores, the district court denied Mr. Meier's motion for the return of 
his property. Mr. Meier timely appeals from the district court's denial of his motion for 
the return of his property. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinns 
Police were investigating John Meier on allegations that he was involved in thefts 
from local businesses. (12/8/06 ~ r . ' ,  p.6, L.10 - p.7, L.17.) As part of that investigation, 
police searched a storage unit rented by Mr. Meier pursuant to a condition of his 
probation that waived his Fourth Amendment rights against searches. (12/8/06 Tr., p.6, 
Ls.20-23; 4/24/08 Tr., p.39, L.22 - p.40, L.7.) Inside the storage unit, police found a 
In this case, the ldaho Supreme Court has entered an order taking judicial notice of 
the underlying record in ldaho Supreme Court Case No. 34261, Sfafe v. Meier. (35555 
R., pp.6-7.) Because there are multiple transcripts of proceedings, both in ldaho 
Supreme Court Case No. 34261 and in ldaho Supreme Court Case No. 35555, citations 
made to the transcripts of proceedings are made herein with reference to the date on 
which the proceedings occurred. Additionally, citations to the clerk's record will be 
made with reference to the ldaho Supreme Court case number under which the clerk's 
record was prepared. 
briefcase that contained numerous pictures of children that were partially undressed 
and that appeared to be engaged in sexual activities. (I218106 Tr., p.7, L.18 - p.8, L.13; 
p.22, L.6 - p.23, L.20.) They also obtained a home movie showing Mr. Meier engaging 
in sexual acts with a young boy, and other video footage of naked children. (1218106 
Tr., p.17, L.1 - p.21, L.9.) The search also apparently uncovered numerous items that 
the State believed were stolen property, which were also seized. (34261 R., pp.58-79.) 
Mr. Meier was charged with three counts of felony possession of sexually 
exploitative material. (R., pp.21-22.) The State subsequently filed a second information 
alleging that Mr. Meier was a persistent violator and requesting sentencing as such 
under IC § 19-2514. (R., pp.27-28.) Mr. Meier was never charged with any theft 
offense based upon the other items recovered from the storage unit. (34261 R., pp.6-7, 
13-14, 21-22, 27-28.) 
Mr. Meier pleaded guilty via an ~ l f o r d  plea to one charge of felony possession of 
sexually exploitative material and to his status as a persistent violator. (316107 Tr., p.9, 
L.15 - p.13, L.l; R., pp.45-46.) As part of the plea agreement, the State agreed not to 
pursue any charges relating to grand thefi or forgery, nor was Mr. Meier obligated to pay 
any restitution for any items that were not a part of the charges that Mr. Meier was 
pleading guilty to. (316107 Tr., p.5, Ls. 19-24; 11129107 Tr., p.10, Ls.14-16.) Specifically, 
"in exchange for [Mr. Meier's] guilty plea, the State is not going to file any grand theft 
charges or additional charges against him for crimes allegedly committed against Home 
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), permits a defendant to enter a guilty plea 
to the charged offense despite maintaining his or her innocence of the crime. 
Depot or  owe's."^ (316107 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-13.) (emphasis added.) But the State was free 
to make any sentencing recommendation to the court. (316107 Tr., p.6, Ls.11-18.) 
The district court imposed a fixed life sentence. (511107 Tr., p.33, L.21 - p.35, 
L.9; R., pp.45-46.) Mr. Meier timely appealed and challenged the sentence executed by 
the district court. 
While the direct appeal of his sentence was pending, Mr. Meier filed a motion for 
the release of property pursuant to I.C.R. 41.1, along with an itemized list of the 
property that he was requesting that the State return. (34261 R., pp.52-79.) The State 
objected to Mr. Meier's motion, and provided an unsworn account of the underlying 
circumstances of the original search, which was apparently a search conducted 
pursuant to a Fourth Amendment waiver that was part of Mr. Meier's probation 
agreement. (35555 R., pp.12-18.) The State alleged that the property Mr. Meier was 
seeking was stolen, and that Mr. Meier had waived the right to assert any interest in this 
property as part of the plea agreement. (35555 R., p. 17.) 
At the hearing on Mr. Meier's motion, the district court articulated its belief that 
Mr. Meier bore the burden of establishing that he was the rightful owner of the property 
that he was seeking, although the court did note that there was a prima facie factual 
indication of his possessory interest because the property was in his possession at the 
time it was taken by the State. (4124108 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-17.) Mr. Meier testified that he 
had rented the storage unit where the property was taken from, and that all of the 
property taken was his. (4/24108Tr., p.9, L.22-p.10, L.16, p.11, Ls.3-5, p.18, L.23- 
This Court may wish to note that, since there was never any complaint or information 
charging Mr. Meier with a theft offense, there does not appear to be any legal allegation 
that this theft occurred. (34261 R., pp.6-713-14,21-22, 27-28.) 
p.19, L.9.) He further explained that he was employed in the construction trade, and 
also installed car stereos, and that the items taken were personal tools that he used in 
his employment. (4124108 Tr., p.1 I ,  L.23 - p.12, L.25.) 
The district court asked the State whether there was ever a warrant issued in 
support of the initial search of Mr. Meier's storage locker from which the property at 
issue was seized. (4124108 Tr., p.39, L.22 - p.40, L.4.) The State conceded that there 
was no warrant and that the search was conducted pursuant to Mr. Meier's Fourth 
Amendment waiver that was part of the terms and conditions of his probation. (4124108 
Tr., p.40, Ls.5-7.) 
The district court then asked the prosecutor for the basis for the State's assertion 
that the items listed on the police inventory were stolen. (4124108 Tr., p.41, Ls.3-6.) 
The State admitted that it did not have evidence in the record at that time, but proffered 
what the prosecutor believed that she could show at a later time. (4124108 Tr., p.41, 
Ls.7-10.) This included that two other people believed to have been involved in the 
alleged theft were ordered to pay restitution, there was a videotape of "people coming 
and going" who were alleged to have used receipts to return stolen property in 
exchange for money, and loss prevention officers from the stores identified the property 
as coming from their stores. (4124108 Tr., p.41, L.1 I - p.42, L.1.) 
The State also argued that, when it waived the right to bring any charges related 
to the alleged thefts, Mr. Meier had somehow admitted that the property was stolen or 
otherwise waived a claim of ownership to this property. (4/24/08 Tr., p.42, L.3 - p.43, 
L.3.) The district court disagreed and found that Mr. Meier made no waiver of a claim to 
the property as a part of his plea. (4124108 Tr., p.43, L.4 - p.44, L.15, p.53, Ls.21-25.) 
Given that the State did not have evidence at the time of the hearing to support 
its assertion that the property at issue was stolen, the district court continued the matter 
in order to give the State the opportunity to provide that evidence. (4124108 Tr., p.54, 
L.21 - p.55, L.7.) The court also indicated that it would provide Mr. Meier time to 
respond to the State's evidence once it was submitted. (4124108 Tr., p.57, Ls.2-3.) 
The State filed with the district court affidavits from loss prevention officers from 
Home Depot, Lowes, and Builder's Lighting. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-15; 
Affidavit of Victor Rodriguez, pp.1-7; and Affidavit of Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-3; 
A~gment.~) The substance of these affidavits is virtually identical. Each contains a 
recitation of the name of the affiant, his affiliation with a store, that the affiant was 
contacted by the Boise Police Department, and that the affiant visually inspected and 
identified various items of property listed on the attached police inventory list as being 
stolen from their store as part of a refund scheme. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-15; 
Affidavit of Victor Rodriguez, pp.1-7; and Affidavit of Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-3.) None 
of the affidavits provides information regarding how the affiants determined that the 
property visually inspected and listed on the invoice sheet was the property of their 
store, or what information supported the affiants' conclusions that the property was 
stolen. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-15; Affidavit of Victor Rodriguez, pp.1-7; and 
Affidavit of Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-3.) 
Mr. Meier has sought to augment the record on appeal in this case with the affidavits 
of Josh Toulouse, Victor Rodriguez, and Stewart Reynolds though a motion to augment 
that is filed concurrently with Mr. Meier's Appellant's Brief. For ease of reference, the 
pages of the affidavits and attached invoices have been hand-numbered consecutively. 
After the State submitted affidavits from the affiants employed by Lowes, Home 
Depot, and Builder's Lighting, Mr. Meier filed a response in which he asserted that these 
affidavits were conclusory and that they did not offer specific facts in support of the 
conclusion that the items were stolen from these stores. (35555 R., p.21.) Mr. Meier 
also requested an order from the district court for production of several receipts from 
these stores which indicated many of the items of property in dispute may have been 
purchased. (35555 R., pp.21-23.) He requested copies of these receipts in order to 
provide further proof that he was the rightful owner of the property. (35555 R., pp.21- 
23.) The State responded that the affidavits were not conclusory because each of the 
affiants swore that they visually inspected the property at issue and identified them as 
stolen. (35555 R., pp.26-27.) 
The district court denied Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property. (35555 
R., pp.29-31.) The court found that, after reviewing Mr. Meier's testimony and affidavit, 
and the affidavits of the loss prevention officers provided by the State, the true owners 
of the property were Lowes, Home Depot, and Builder's Lighting. (35555 R., p.30.) 
Although one of the affidavits of the loss prevention officers omitted a claim of 
ownership to several items of property listed on the police invoices, the district court 
found that this was an inadvertent omission. (35555 R., p.30.) As a component of this 
finding, the district court found that Mr. Toulouse had referenced three pages of 
inventory and "[tlhere were actually 34 items listed on the final three pages," as 
opposed to the 29 items that were listed in the affidavit of Josh Toulouse. (35555 R., 
p.30.) In reality, there were four additional pages attached to the affidavit of Josh 
Toulouse, three of which indicated 29 items and one of which listed five. (Affidavit of 
Josh Toulouse, pp.12-15.) Based on the district court's erroneous calculation of the 
number of pages attached to Mr. Toulouse's affidavit, the court excused the State from 
any obligation to provide additional evidence regarding the ownership of the omitted 
items because the court found that the reference to three additional pages would 
subsume all of the items on the attached police inventory. (35555 R., pp.30-31.) 
Mr. Meier timely appeals from the district court's order denying his motion for the 
return of his property. 
ISSUE 
Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Meier's motion for the return 
of his property? 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Meier's Motion For The 
Return Of His Property 
A. Introduction 
ldaho Criminal Rule 41(e) applies to a defendant's motion for the return of 
property that has been taken by the State as the result of a search and seizure. While 
no case law in ldaho delineates the burdens of proof for such actions and other 
applicable legal standards for I.C.R. 41(e), case law interpreting the federal counterpart 
to this rule makes clear that, when no charges are pending regarding the property at 
issue, the burden is on the State to demonstrate that the movant is not entitled to the 
property. The district court in this case improperly shiffed the burden to Mr. Meier, and 
therefore abused its discretion. 
Additionally, the evidence provided by the State in the form of affidavits was too 
conclusory to be of evidentiary value in determining the ultimate issue of ownership of, 
and entitlement to, the property in dispute. As such, the district court's finding that, "the 
various stores are the true owners of the personal property based upon the affidavits of 
the loss prevention officers," was clearly erroneous because it was not supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. 
Finally, the district court abused its discretion when it relieved the State of its 
evidentiary burden of proving that Mr. Meier was not entitled to five items of property 
that were omitted in their entirety from any claim of ownership in the affidavits. 
B. Applicable Law 
As an initial matter, there appears to have been some confusion in the underlying 
proceedings in this case as to which statute or court rule governs the nature of the 
proceedings where a defendant seeks the return of property that was seized by the 
State in the course of a criminal investigation. While the district court relied, in part, on 
the provisions of I.C. § 19-3801 and I.C. § 19-3807, a review of the text of these 
statutes demonstrates that they are not applicable under the facts of this case. 
(11/29/07 Tr., p.5,Ls.18-22; 35555 R., p.29.) ldaho Code § 19-3801 only applies to 
cases where there is an information or charge that has been filed in connection with the 
property. I.C. § 19-3801. And ldaho Code 19-3807 only applies to cases in which the 
defendant has been convicted of a felony and the evidence is contraband. I.C. 19- 
3807. Neither predicate circumstance is present in this case. Moreover, a review of the 
chapter in which these statutes are situated indicates that these statutes apply where 
there has been a specific allegation that the defendant has committed theft offense. 
See I.C. 19-3801 - 3807. As has been noted, Mr. Meier has never been charged 
with a theft offense, and the State has waived the right to ever bring such an allegation 
against Mr. Meier as part of the plea agreement in this case. (316107 Tr., p.5, Ls.9-13; 
34261 R., pp.6-7, 13-14, 21-22, 27-28.) Therefore, to the extent that the district court 
was acting in reliance on these provisions, the district court's reliance was misplaced. 
Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property was brought under the rubric of 
I.C.R. 41.1. (34261 R., p.56.) The State addressed Mr. Meier's contentions as a 
motion for return of property under I.C.R. 41(e). (35555 R., p.15.) However, this Court 
has recognized that, with regards to motions, it is the substance of the relief sought, and 
not the label attached to the motion, that controls the analysis. See, e.g., Howard v. 
FMC Corp., 98 ldaho 465, 471, 567 P.2d 10, 16 (1977) (the title of a legal document is 
not controlling as to its legal effect); Anderson v. Springer, 78 ldaho 17, 22, 296 P.2d 
1024, 1027 (1956) (the character of a pleading is determined by its contents and not by 
the name by which it is called); Ade v. Baffen, 126 ldaho 114, 116 n.1, 878 P.2d 813, 
815 (Ct. App. 1994). In this case, it is apparent that, given the nature of Mr. Meier's 
request for relief, ldaho Criminal Rule 41(e) would apply. 
ldaho Criminal Rule 41.1 deals with the return of exhibits, and its provisions deal 
with reclaiming exhibits offered or admitted into evidence in connection with a criminal 
action that has been commenced by the State. I.C.R. 41.1. Again, no criminal action 
was ever commenced against Mr. Meier in connection with the property at issue in this 
appeal. However, ldaho Criminal Rule 41(e) applies where the party seeking the return 
of the property is a party aggrieved by a search and seizure undertaken by the State. 
I.C.R. 41(e). This is the set of circumstances under which Mr. Meier sought the return 
of his property. As such, the provisions of I.C.R. 41(e) apply to the district court's 
decision to deny Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property. 
C. Under Applicable Leaal Standards. The District Court's Denial Of Mr. Meier's 
Motion For The Return Of His Propertv Was An Abuse Of Discretion 
There does not appear to be case law in ldaho specifically discussing the 
burdens of proof and applicable legal standards when a defendant seeks the return of 
property that was seized pursuant to a criminal investigation on a charge that was either 
never filed or was subsequently di~missed.~ However, because ldaho Criminal Rule 
41(e) is substantially the same as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(g), federal 
cases discussing this provision provide substantial guidance for this court6 See, e.g., 
Campbell v. Kildew, 141 ldaho 640, 646, 115 P.3d 731, 737 (2005); State v. Carrasco, 
117 ldaho 295,298,787 P.2d 281,284 (1990). 
"A district court has jurisdiction to entertain motions to return property seized by 
the government when there are no criminal proceedings pending against the movant." 
U.S. v. Mattinson, 809 F.2d 1364, 1366-1367 (gth Cir. 1987). The district court findings 
of fact pursuant to a Rule 41 (e) motion are reviewed for clear error, and the court's legal 
conciusions are reviewed de novo. Butler Trailer Manufacturing v. State, 132 ldaho 
687, 691, 978 P.2d 247, 251 (Ct. App. 1999); U.S. V. VanHorn, 296 F.3d 713, 719 (8th 
Cir. 2002). Denial of a Rule 41(e) motion is generally proper where the defendant is not 
The only decision that appellate counsel was able to locate regarding a defendant's 
motion for return of property under I.C.R. 41(e) deals primarily with the issue of whether 
there was sufficient evidence to support the district court's finding that the items 
requested in the motion for return of property were not actually taken by the State. See 
Butler Trailer Manufacturing v. State, 132 ldaho 687, 691-692, 978 P.2d 247, 251-252 
(Ct. App. 'i999). This opinion does not set forth the applicable legal standards for such 
motions outside of the context of its holding regarding the necessity of the district court 
to make a determination of what was seized by the State and noting the fact that a 
police inventory is important evidence in making this determination. Id. However, there 
is no dispute that the police seized the items listed on the police inventory, and 
therefore the ultimate holding in Butler Trailer Manufacturing does not appear to be of 
assistance in the resolution of the issues in this appeal. 
On December 1, 2002, F.R.Cr.P. 41(e) was redesignated as F.R.Cr.P. 41(g). See 
Jackson v. U.S., 526 F.3d 394, 396 n.1 (8th Cir. 2008). However, this renumbering did 
not alter the substance of the rule. Id. Therefore, some of the federal case law 
discussing this provision of the federal rules references F.R.Cr.P. 41(e), rather than 
F.R.Cr.P. 41(g), where the motion for return of property was filed prior to the 
renumbering of the rule in 2002. 
lawfully entitled to the property, the property is contraband, or if the government's need 
of the property as evidence in an ongoing case continues. VanHorn, 296 F.3d at 719. 
The relative burden of proof on the parties depends on the procedural posture of 
the case. Marfinson, 809 F.2d at 1369. Specifically, whether the defendant or the State 
bears the burden of establishing a right to possession of the property depends upon the 
status of the underlying criminal allegations that purport to justify the State's seizure of 
the property. If the motion for the return of property is filed while a criminal investigation 
is pending, the movant bears the burden of proving that the seizure of the property was 
illegal and that he or she is entitled to legal possession of the property. Id. However, 
when the property in question is no longer needed for evidentiary purposes, either 
because trial is complete, the defendant has pleaded guilty, or the State has abandoned 
the charges and investigation, then the burden of proof shifts. Id. "The person from 
whom the property is seized is presumed to have the right to its return, and the 
government has the burden of demonstrating that it has a legitimate reason to detain 
the property." Id; see also U.S. v. Potes Ramirez, 260 F.3d 1310 ( l l t h  Cir. 2001); 
U.S. v. Chambers, 192 F.3d 374, 377 (3@ Cir. 1999). Part of the State's burden 
includes providing evidence that establishes that the property in dispute is contraband 
or the fruit of illegal activity. Marfinson, 809 F.2d at 1370; see also Merlington v. State, 
839 N.E.2d 260, 263 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005). The seizure of property from a person is 
prima facie evidence of that person's ownership of and entitlement to the property. 
U.S. v. Wright, 610 F.2d 930, 939 (D.C. Cir. 1979). 
The district court in this case improperly shifted the initial burden of proof onto 
Mr. Meier. While the district court noted that the fact that the State had taken items 
from Mr. Meier's possession constituted prima facie evidence of his interest in the 
property, the court incorrectly believed that the burden was on Mr. Meier to establish 
that, "he is entitled to lawful possession of certain property that is in the custody of the 
state." (4124108 Tr., p.7, Ls.7-17.) Because the State had elected to not bring any 
charges against Mr. Meier regarding the property at issue in this appeal, and had 
waived the right to bring any such charges in the future against Mr. Meier, the State 
bore the initial burden of proof in this case. Marfinson, 809 F.2d at 1369-1370. 
Additionally, there was insufficient evidence submitted to the district court that the 
property at issue in this case was actually stolen by Mr. Meier. A district court judge 
may not rely merely on the representations of the State regarding a material issue 
bearing on a motion for the return of property, but must instead rely on the evidence 
presented. Mora v. U.S., 955 F.2d 156, 158 (2"d Cir. 1992). This is reflected in the 
language of I.C.R. 41(e), which provides that, "The court shall receive evidence on any 
issue necessary to the decision on the motion." I.C.R. 41(e). In light of the requirement 
that the State present evidence in support of its contentions that the property should not 
be returned to the defendant, or that the property does not belong to the defendant, the 
prosecution's representations to the district court regarding suspicions that Mr. Meier 
had stolen the property are not a legitimate basis to support the district court's ruling in 
this case. 
The remaining evidence is also insufficient to support the district court's ruling 
that "the various stores are the true owners of the personal property based upon the 
affidavits of the loss prevention officers." (35555 R., p.30.) Information contained in an 
affidavit may be inadequate for evidentiary purposes if the affidavit is conclusory. See, 
e.g., State V. Johnson, 110 ldaho 516, 527, 716 P.2d 1288,1299 (1986); Posey v. Ford 
Motor Credit Co., 141 ldaho 477, 483, 111 P.3d 162, 168 (Ct. App. 2005); Bickerstaff v. 
Vassar College, 196 F.3d 435 (2"d Cir. 1999). And an affidavit is merely conclusory if it 
contains bare allegations with no indication of the affiant's factual basis for the 
allegation or conclusion. Johnson, 110 ldaho at 527, 716 P.2d at 1299. The district 
court may not base its decision solely on conclusory affidavits, because doing so 
constitutes a "mere ratification of the bare conciusions of others." Illinois v. Gates, 462 
U.S. 213, 239 (1983). Instead, an affidavit must include concrete particulars in support 
of the conclusions contained within it. See, e.g., Bickersfaff, 196 F.3d at 451-452. An 
affidavit that lacks such particulars cannot even create a genuine issue of material fact 
in an action, much less carry the full evidentiary burden in a case. See Id. 
For example, the Court in Johnson deemed an affidavit too conclusory to have 
been useful for purposes of establishing probable cause for a warrant. The affidavit at 
issue recited that the defendant's landlord had observed "suspicious plants" in the 
defendant's apartment. Johnson, 110 ldaho at 527,716 P.2d at 1299. The Court noted 
that there was no information contained in the affidavit as to why the plants were 
characterized as "suspicious" by the landlord, and therefore the court lacked evidence 
by which to determine whether the landlord had a proper basis of knowledge to support 
his conclusions. Id. There also was no description of the plants that would have 
permitted the court to evaluate for itself whether the plants were suspicious. Id. 
In this case, the affidavits supplied by the State were similarly too conclusory in 
nature to have had evidentiary value for the district court, and therefore cannot support 
a finding by a preponderance of the evidence that, "the various stores are the true 
owners of the property based upon the affidavits of the loss prevention officers." (35555 
R., p.30.) The sum total of the information provided in the affidavits supplied by the 
State is as follows: (1) the name of the affiant; (2) the store that employed the affiant 
and the nature of that employment; (3) that the affiant was contacted by the Boise 
Police Department and the date of that contact; (4) that the affiant visually inspected the 
property; and (5) that the affiant identified the property listed on the attached invoices as 
being stolen from the affiant's store "in August, 2006, as part of a refund scheme." 
(Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-2; Affidavit of Victor Rodriquez, pp.1-2; Affidavit of 
Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-2.) These affidavits are nearly identical, and use the exact 
same pro forma terminology, with the only meaningful distinction between them being 
the names of the affiant, the store who employs them, and what pages of the police 
invoice are attached to the affidavit. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-2; Affidavit of 
Victor Rodriquez, pp.1-2; Affidavit of Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-2.) 
There is nothing in the affidavits that provides the basis for each of these 
individuals' conclusion that the property they inspected came from their store. (Affidavit 
of Josh Toulouse, pp.1-2; Affidavit of Victor Rodriquez, pp.1-2; Affidavit of Stewart 
Reynolds, pp.1-2.) There is likewise nothing in the affidavits, or any other evidence in 
this case, that provides a factual basis for the bald assertion that this property had been 
stolen, "in August, 2006, as part of a refund scheme." (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.1- 
2; Affidavit of Victor Rodriquez, pp.1-2; Affidavit of Stewart Reynolds, pp.1-2.) In short, 
there is a complete and utter absence of any concrete, factual particulars within these 
affidavits that could support the district court's finding that these affidavits proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence that "the various stores are the true owners of the 
personal property," that is at issue in this appeal. See Johnson, 110 Idaho at 527, 716 
P.2d at 1299. (35555 R., p.30.) Instead, the district court merely ratified the conclusory 
assertions of the affidavits. See Gafes, 462 U.S. at 239. 
Moreover, because the search was executed as a probation search without a 
search warrant, there has not even been a finding of probable cause to believe that 
Mr. Meier had stolen any property. (4124108 Tr., p.39, L.22 - p.40, L.7.) Mr. Meier 
testified unequivocally that the property taken by the police was his own property and no 
oneelse's. (4124108Tr., p.9, L.22-p.10, L.16, p.11, Ls.3-5, p.18, L.23-p.19, L.9.) 
And, the police invoices themselves list several receipts from purchases from the stores 
who had filed affidavits claiming ownership of the property. (35555 R., pp.23-25). As 
noted in Mr. Meier's Response in Support of Motion to Return Property, these receipts 
likely indicated that Mr. Meier had purchased these items, which is additional proof of 
his lawful ownership and right to the return of the property.7 (35555 R., pp.21-22.) In 
short, the district court's finding that the various stores where the true owners of the 
property was not supported by substantial, competent evidence. As such, the district 
court's order denying Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property was an abuse of 
discretion. 
While Mr. Meier requested production of these receipts in his Response in Support of 
Defendant's Motion to Return Property, there is no indication whether these receipts 
were produced. (35555 R., pp.21-22.) In absence of such an indication, Mr. Meier 
does not herein raise any issue regarding the withholding these receipts, as the record 
makes no indication whether they were or were not ultimately provided to him. 
D. The District Court's Conclusion That The State Was Relieved Of Its Burden Of 
Proof Regarding An Adverse Claim Of Ownership To Five Of The Items Omitted 
From The Affidavit Of Josh Toulouse On Behalf Of Home Depot Was An Abuse 
Of Discretion 
Josh Toulouse provided an affidavit on behalf of Home Depot in his capacity as a 
loss prevention officer for the store. (See Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, p.1.) The district 
court noted, in its order denying Mr. Meier's motion for the return of his property, that 
the affidavit provided by Josh Toulouse on behalf of Home Depot (hereinafter, Toulouse 
affidavit) omitted any claim of ownership to five items that were listed on the police 
inventory forms. (35555 R., pp.30-31.) While the Toulouse affidavit recites that 
Mr. Toulouse "visually inspected and identified twenty-nine (29) items listed on the 
attached three pages of property invoices and determined that they had been stolen 
from the Home Depot, in August 2006, as part of a refund scheme," the district court 
found that, "the llth page of the material attached to the Toulouse affidavit lists five 
items of property which were not mentioned in the body of the affidavit." (35555 
R., p.30; Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, p.2.) The district court then found that there were 
"actually 34 items listed on the final three pages, and that, "[tlhose five items listed on 
the third to the last page of the material attached to the affidavit appeared to have been 
inadvertently skipped over by the affiant." (35555 R., p.30.) But, because the Toulouse 
affidavit mentioned "three pages of invoices," the district court found that the affiant 
meant to testify as to ownership of all 34 items in the final pages of the affidavit. (35555 
R.; pp.30-31.) The district court then excused the State from any further obligation in 
providing proof of any adverse claim of ownership in the five outstanding items. (35555 
R., pp.30-31.) 
There are two reasons why the district court's actions were in error. First, and 
most important, there are actually four additional pages of items listed on the police 
inventory, and not three. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.12-15.) The Toulouse affidavit 
initially recites that he inspected and identified 81 items on the first nine pages of the 
attached inventory sheets as being property stolen from his store. (Affidavit of Josh 
Toulouse, p.1.) A review of the initial nine pages of inventory attached to this affidavit 
indicates 81 items listed. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.3-1 I .) But, there are four, and 
not three, additional pages of inventory that follow the initial nine. (Affidavit of Josh 
Toulouse, pp. 12-1 5.) 
The Toulouse affidavit only asserts that Mr. Toulouse, "visually inspected and 
identified twenty nine (29) items listed on the attached three pages of property invoices," 
in conjunction with his claim that these items were stolen from his store. (Affidavit of 
Josh Toulouse, p.2.) The first of the remaining four pages indicates items that are 
numbered one through ten, consecutively. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, p.12.) The third 
and fourth pages indicate items numbered eleven through twenty, and twenty-one 
through twenty-nine, respectively. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, pp.14-15.) However, the 
second page of the last four pages of inventory attached to the Toulouse affidavit lists 
five items that are not claimed anywhere within the affidavit submitted by Mr. Touiouse. 
(Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, p.13.) It is apparent, given the consecutive numbering of 
the items from one through twenty-nine, that the Toulouse affidavit is only referencing 
the first, third, and fourth pages of the final four pages of attached inventory. (Affidavit 
of Josh Toulouse, pp.2, 12, 14-15.) The second page, with five items listed on the 
inventory sheet, is omitted in its entirety from Mr. Toulouse's affidavit claiming a right to 
return of some of the items taken from Mr. Meier as stolen property. (Affidavit of Josh 
Toulouse, pp.1-2, 13.) 
It is also worth noting that the inventory forms attached to the Toulouse affidavit 
only provide enough space to list ten items on each page. (Affidavit of Josh Toulouse, 
pp. 3-15.) In light of this, it would be impossible for three pages of this form to contain 
34 items, as was found by the district court. (35555 R., p.30.) As such, the district 
court's finding that there were "actually 34 items of property listed on the final three 
pages," and that therefore Mr. Toulouse had implicitly claimed ownership to all of the 
items indicated on the attached inventory sheets, was clearly erroneous. (35555 
R., p.30.) 
Second, the district court's ruling was in contravention of the applicable legal 
standards that place the burden of proof on the State to establish that the defendant is 
not entitled to lawful possession. Marfinson, 809 F.2d at 1369. The district court's 
finding that the State did not have to establish any adverse claim of ownership to the 
five items that were omitted from the Toulouse affidavit was based upon a clearly 
erroneous finding of fact, and was further against clearly applicable legal standards. As 
such, this conclusion was an abuse of the district court's discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Meier respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court's order 
denying Mr. Meier's motion for return of property, and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
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